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政府悖论、国企垄断与中国经济发展

The Government Paradox, Monopoly of State-owned

Enterprises and China's Economic Development

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摘 要

中国经济虽然已经持续了 30 多年的高速经济增长，创造了中国式“增长奇迹”；但是增长背后存在的问题也值得我们深思。这关系着中国改革的下一步怎么走、增长能否持续的问题。中国经济增长可归为地方政府主导的投资拉动型经济增长模式，也是政府主导的转型式增长。在这个过程中，地方政府主导和国有企业垄断是中国经济转型的典型特征。很多时候，地方政府主导增长和投资的行为是通过垄断性国有企业来运作和实施，地方政府与国有企业垄断之间的关系越来越超越经济属性，而更像是是一种行政关系。那么，研究增长背后的问题就不能不考虑垄断国有企业的的影响，特别是受地方政府保护和干预的垄断国有企业。这也是本文从地方政府主导和国有企业垄断相结合的视角研究增长问题的缘由。中国这样一个地方政府主导经济发展模式的国家，地方政府主导及其与国有企业垄断的结合会将中国的经济增长引致到一个什么样的发展轨道中去？本文的意图就是通过界定地方政府主导的内涵，探索地方政府主导与国有企业垄断相结合影响经济增长的可能途径，为诸多的改革现象提供一个逻辑自洽的解释，进而拓展人们的认识，并纠正改革过程中存在的一些认识误区。

改革走到今天，政府对国有垄断企业的控制不减反增，使得受政府庇护的国有垄断企业对经济增长产生了各种各样的负面效应。本文的主旨在于回答：“地方政府主导及其与国有企业垄断的结合会将经济增长引致到一个什么样的发展轨道中？”这一问题。为达到这一目的，我们基于事实观察梳理出：第一，大量的国有垄断企业享受着政府的优惠和扶持政策，相较而言，民营企业却受到明显的歧视和限制，如行业禁入、资源要素获取等。政府对国有企业垄断的这种爱护实质上就是对其他没有机会与权力相结合的民营企业的一种侵害，因而地方政府主导及其与国有企业垄断的结合就成为阻碍民营经济发展的体制障碍。第二，在政府二元悖论激励目标下，地方政府间的竞争及对资本密集型行业的偏好将会导致行业产能过剩、产业结构失衡；并且政府对国有企业垄断的控制力度越大，国有垄断企业的过度投资问题就越严重，从而妨碍了产业结构升级。第三，政府主导下的经济增长会引致要素资源配置扭曲其正常价格，把

具有巨大经济价值的资源无偿或低偿授予国有垄断企业，只收很少的象征性的资源税和资源使用费，变成了国有垄断企业的“高额利润”，最终被既得利益集团强占、瓜分，导致贫富差距的日益扩大。既然地方政府主导行为及其与国有企业垄断结合的负面影响如此卓著，那又为什么地方政府仍然乐此不疲呢？我们知道，地方政府和任何一个社会主体一样，需要考虑自己和本辖区的利益；问题的症结在于，政府官员在什么样的体制环境下会去争取自己的利益。设定适当的体制，使局部和整体能够实现“激励兼容”，这就需要中央政府做对激励。而中央转移支付是中央政府调控地方政府行为的主要途径这一，因此，在第七章，通过对包干制与分税制效率的比较，探讨了中央政府的体制决策对地方政府行为的影响及中央转移支付的效率问题。

通过一系列的研究，我们认为，在市场环境日渐成熟的条件下，地方政府主导的发展模式的弊端就愈发显著。单纯的国有企业垄断的危害不大，但是政府与国有企业垄断的结合体即行政垄断却是导致经济增长问题的体制原因。就此而言，我们的政策含义非常鲜明，就是要消除行政垄断，将政府与国有企业分开，加快市场化改革进程，转变政府职能，从政府主导型市场经济向市场主导型市场经济过渡。

关键词：政府主导；国有企业垄断；行政垄断；经济发展

Abstract

China's economy has been going on 30 years of rapid economic growth, to create a Chinese-style "growth miracle", but problems behind growth are also worth pondering. This affects China's next phase of reform and the sustainability of growth. China's economic growth can be classified as local government-led investment-driven model of economic growth, and also government-led transformation growth. In this process, the local government-led and state-owned monopoly is typical features of China's economic transformation. In many cases, the local government-led growth and investment behavior is to operate through state-owned monopoly, the relationship between the local government and state-owned monopoly growing beyond the economic attributes, but rather is an administrative relationship. Well, research on growth issues can not fail to consider the impact of state-owned monopoly, especially that by the local government protection and intervention. This is why the paper studies growth issues from the combined perspective of local government-led and state-owned monopoly. In China, the combination of local government-led and state-owned monopoly will lead China's economic growth to what kind of development track? The paper is mainly to explore how they affect economic growth by defining government-led connotation to provide a logical interpretation for many reform's phenomenon, and then expand people's awareness and correct some misunderstanding in the reform process.

The reform went today, that government control of state-owned monopoly increased rather than decreased made it produce a variety of negative effects on economic growth. This paper is to answer, "What kind of development track the local government-led combined with state-owned monopoly will lead economic growth to?" To achieve this objective, we tease out based on realistic observation: First, a large number of state-owned monopoly enjoy government incentives and supportive policies, by contrast, private enterprises are subject to significant

discrimination and restrictions, such as industry bannering, resource to obtain and so on. Government taking good care of state-owned monopoly is a violation of other private enterprises without the opportunity to work with power, and thus government-led combining with state-owned monopoly becomes the institutional barriers impeding the development of private economy. Second, under the incentive goal of government binary paradox, competition among local governments and their preference for capital-intensive industries will lead to industry overcapacity, industrial structure imbalance; and more efforts government controls state-owned monopoly, more serious state-owned monopolies invest excessively, and thus hinders industrial structure's upgrading. Third, government-led economic growth will make misallocation of resources distort its normal price. Enormous economic value of resources which are granted to state-owned monopoly unpaid or at a low price become state-owned monopoly's "high profits" which is eventually seized and divided up, widening the gap between the rich and the poor. The negative impact which the local government-led combining with state-owned monopoly has is so outstanding, why local governments still enjoy it? We know local governments like any social groups need consider their own and jurisdiction's interest. The problem is that government officer fight for their interests in what institutional environment. To set the appropriate institution which makes local and overall achieve "incentive compatible" requires the central government to do the right incentives. Central transfers are one of the main way which the central government regulates local government behavior, therefore, in the seventh chapter, we explore impact of the central government's institutional decisions on local government behavior and central transfer's efficiency issues by comparison the contract system with the tax-sharing system.

We believe that local government-led development model's drawbacks are more and more significant with mature market environment through a series of studies. Pure state-owned monopoly has little risk, but the combination of government and state-owned monopoly is the institutional reasons leading to growth issues. In this

regard, our policy implication is very clear, that is, to eliminate administrative monopoly by separating state-owned monopoly from government, to speed up the process of market-oriented reforms and transform government functions, eventually complete the transition from government-led market economy to market-oriented market economy.

Key words: local government act; state-owned monopoly; administrative monopoly; economic development

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